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 Michael Kagan’s reflections on “secret writing” cut right to the core questions we face 
when we study informal logic and critical thinking:  How can we, and how ought we, make sense 
of texts that encourage multiple interpretations or resist interpretation altogether?  We encounter 
these challenges in their most extreme form when we deal with secret writing, which Kagan 
defines as writing that is deliberately designed to mislead.  Like a prisoner’s file-concealing 
birthday cake, secret writing is the vehicle for some special message or meaning.  Those who are 
not competent to detect the meaning, or who are incompetent at decoding it, take the vessel at 
face value, completely missing what lies within.  
 Understandably, secret writers rarely send clear signals that they are engaging in secret 
writing, but this is the source of real trouble for the earnest reader.  It is one thing to crack a code 
one knows about, but it is far more difficult to recognize, without somehow being in on the 
scheme, that a message is encoded in some otherwise unassuming (or even inscrutable) text. 
 As Kagan suggests, those trained in informal logic and in critical thinking are 
undoubtedly better off when it comes to recognizing secret writing.  They will be trained to catch 
hints, allusions, rhetorical and pragmatic features of a text, enthymemes, audience-relative 
presumptions, etc., and they will be practiced at weaving together alternative interpretations.  
They are ready, in other words, to make the most of the principle of charity—if there’s 
something to get, they are in the best position to get it.   
 But the principle of charity can be pushed too far, and this presents a problem that is both 
interpretive and moral.  The problem comes from the simple fact that any text can be interpreted 
to mean absolutely anything, once we step away from our general, shared understanding about 
how words and texts (and other things) usually work.  The temptations to step away can be 
powerful—we sometimes seem to notice the author winking at us, or we suddenly feel that the 
author, this author, just can’t mean that, or we are just stumped—the text can’t make sense 
unless something else is going on. 
 If these temptations lead us too far off the path of normal interpretation, however, then 
we end up on slippery ice, as Wittgenstein might say, without the benefit of any of the friction 
that would normally lead us to one interpretation over another.  Are the tricky passages in the 
Metaphysics actually about fishing?  Is some of the Kama Sutra’s more absurd advice actually a 
sly commentary on politics?  The answer in both cases might be “yes,” but are we critical 
thinkers licensed, solely by the trickiness or the absurdity, to take them that way?  Surely not.   
 Or, at least, probably not.  We know that some texts are written in code, some are 
parables, some are so thick with irony that they mean nearly the opposite of what they say.  
Plenty of texts are not what they seem to be on the surface, or at first glance—or even at fifth 
glance.  But we cannot come to that judgment with confidence unless we have some sort of 
license.  Of course the tricky thing is to determine what counts as license.   Perhaps the author 
tells us pretty plainly: “This is in code” or, more coyly, “Let those who have ears listen.”  
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Perhaps something about the circumstances in which the text is presented raises suspicion, as 
when the barricaded kidnapper insists on reading to the press a carefully-worded statement that 
appears to have nothing to do with the situation at hand.  Perhaps the text contains its own 
hedges of the sort that Kagan finds in the Meno:  “Of course I don’t insist on any of this…”  
There are many such cues.  But what they have in common is that they signal to us, in more or 
less clear ways, that we can’t take words at face value, that something out of the ordinary is 
going on.  When the cues grow too subtle, our license fades. 
 I would suggest that we ought to resist the idea that something as simple as the fact that a 
text is difficult to interpret constitutes a license-granting cue that secret writing is present.  We 
might think that there’s no harm done if we get into the habit of entering a diagnosis of secret 
writing when we are thoroughly stumped.  But there is harm.  In the first place, a habit like that 
would get us off the hook too easily, letting our interpretive skills grow as dull as our 
arithmetical skills in the age of computers.  Kagan is clearly a very skilled reader of notoriously 
difficult texts, but I would suggest that we don’t have to see Plato as a secret writer, at least not 
based on the presentation of the doctrine of recollection in the Meno.    
 Plato’s Socrates is indeed frustratingly non-committal on the details of the “doctrine,” but 
surely this can be explained largely by the fact that, within the dialogue, his main goal seems to 
be to get Meno to submit to a proper investigation into the nature of virtue.  If a fable about 
recollection, complete with a demonstration, will get Meno’s mind off of the “debater’s paradox” 
he raises, then so be it.  Whether or not the recollection idea stands up to scrutiny on its own 
seems beside the point—it needs to satisfy Meno, and it does.  Sort of.  (If there is a remaining 
problem, unnoticed by Meno, about how learning happens before birth, that can be taken up 
where it is more to the point, as it is in the Phaedo.)   Socrates may be speaking without 
believing fully in what he is saying, but that’s no reason to suppose that he--or Plato--is at the 
same time trying to communicate some other doctrine in which he really does believe.  
 By weakening our interpretive skills, the habitual appeal to secret writing would actually 
threaten our ability to understand difficult texts, but there is a more important reason to avoid the 
habit.  Getting used to the idea that any text could mean something very different, inaccessibly 
different, from what it “says” would undermine the very conditions of significance themselves.  
Linguistic community--community, period--depends on our faith that, as Cavell puts it, we mean 
what we say.  Some of the paradigm cases raised by Kagan involve emergencies—cases in which 
the straightforward communication of the actual message would have placed the author’s 
livelihood or life at risk.  It is an emergency indeed when communication requires, strictly 
speaking, the erosion of the grounds of communication.  We should feel for those in such straits, 
and at the same time we should refuse to believe that those in less weighty circumstances would 
similarly endanger our very hard-earned significatory practices.  Without those practices we 
would be in dire straits indeed.  We should thus teach our ILCT students to resist, for as long as 
they can, the idea that the inscrutable text before them contains secret writing.  I don’t insist that 
every part of this argument is exactly right, but I do insist that we’ll be better off if we proceed as 
if it is. 
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